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Going around the Vienna Circle: Wittgenstein and Verification

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Abstract

I argue that Wittgenstein's short-lived verificationism (c.1929–30) differed from that of his contacts in the Vienna Circle in not being a reductionist view. It lay the groundwork for his later views that the meaning of a word is determined by its use and that certain “propositions of the form of empirical propositions” (On Certainty, §§96, 401, 402) act as “norm[s] of description” (On Certainty, §§167, 321). He gave it up once he realized that it contradicted his rejection of logical atomism, and that he ever held such a view at all says something about his respect for the leader of the Vienna Circle, Moritz Schlick.
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2005-07-01

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