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The Truth about Philosophical Investigations I §§134–137

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Abstract:

Abstract

A broad, though not unanimous, consensus among commentators is that the later Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy conception of truth. I reject that interpretation. No doubt much depends on what is meant by a redundancy theory. But once even mildly plausible versions of that view are isolated a review of the relevant texts shows that the evidence for that interpretation collapses. Moreover, the redundancy interpretation is at odds with guiding prescriptions in the post-1932 corpus. Wittgenstein doesn’t hold that truth can be defined or characterized thinly, as redundancy theorists propose, but that it isn’t susceptible to any such generic treatment.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00249.x

Affiliations: Temple University

Publication date: April 1, 2005

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