The Truth about Philosophical Investigations I §§134–137

Author: Vision Gerald¹

Source: Philosophical Investigations, Volume 28, Number 2, April 2005 , pp. 159-176(18)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

A broad, though not unanimous, consensus among commentators is that the later Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy conception of truth. I reject that interpretation. No doubt much depends on what is meant by a redundancy theory. But once even mildly plausible versions of that view are isolated a review of the relevant texts shows that the evidence for that interpretation collapses. Moreover, the redundancy interpretation is at odds with guiding prescriptions in the post-1932 corpus. Wittgenstein doesn’t hold that truth can be defined or characterized thinly, as redundancy theorists propose, but that it isn’t susceptible to any such generic treatment.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00249.x

Affiliations: 1: Temple University

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