XIII —HYPER-RELIABILITY AND APRIORITY

Author: Pryor, James1

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 106, Number 3, May 2006 , pp. 327-344(18)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held—like Lexist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack— needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00200.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy New York University New York, NY 1003 USA

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