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XIII —HYPER-RELIABILITY AND APRIORITY

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Abstract:

ABSTRACT

I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held—like Lexist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack— needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00200.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy New York University New York, NY 1003 USA

Publication date: May 1, 2006

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