INTENTIONALITY WITHOUT RATIONALITY

Author: Bortolotti, Lisa1

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 105, Number 3, May 2005 , pp. 385-392(8)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00181.x

Affiliations: 1: Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, University of Manchester, Email: Lisa.Bortolotti@manchester.ac.uk

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