THREE FORMS OF AGENTIAL COMMITMENT: REPLY TO CULLITY AND GERRANS
Human agents are purposive agents who are also capable of stronger forms of agency, including forms of self-governance. Or so it seems. A central problem in the philosophy of action is how to understand these stronger forms of agency, and what further philosophical commitments are required for their understanding. Recent work in Frankfurt-influenced philosophy of action on ownership, identi.cation, internality, authority, and endorsement are, at least in large part, efforts to develop a sufficiently rich theoretical apparatus for this task. At bottom is the idea that strong forms of agency that are of interest can be modelled within, as Cullity and Gerrans put it, a ‘nonhomuncular causal account of agency’. Self-governance is constituted by forms of psychological functioning that appropriatelyinvolve identification and the like. And we explain these phenomena within a ‘non-homuncular causal account’.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-2155, USA
Publication date: 2004-05-01