TEMPORAL NECESSITY AND LOGICAL FATALISM
I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Logic and Metaphysics, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, KY16 9AL., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 2004-05-01