Recarving Content: Hale’s Final Proposal

Authors: Potter M.; Smiley T.

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 102, Number 3, April 2002 , pp. 301-304(4)

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Abstract:

Bob Hale has explored several ways of giving substance to Frege’s metaphor that the two sides of Hume’s Principle are recarvings of the same content. In our (2001) we criticised what was then the latest version. Even as we wrote, however, his proposed notion of content was undergoing radical surgery, its epistemic part being cut out and its logical part transformed. Here we show that his new definition does not work either.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge

Publication date: 2002-04-01