IV—Is Truth Supervenient on Being?

Author: Dodd J.

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 102, Number 1, September 2001 , pp. 69-86(18)

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Abstract:

This paper asks whether we should accept a weakened version of the truthmaker principle: namely, the claim that truth supervenes on being, in which ‘being’ is understood as whether things are. I consider a number of positive answers to this question, including the following: that the truthmaker principle is a requirement of any plausible explanation of truth; that the principle must be accepted, if we are to do justice to the Wittgensteinian insight that the world is the totality of facts, not of things; and that the correctness of the principle is a necessary condition of a realist metaphysics. In my view, none of these attempts to motivate the truthmaker principle is satisfactory.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Centre for Philosophy, Department of Government, University of Manchester

Publication date: 2001-09-01