XII—Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience

Author: Noonan H.W.

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Number 3, 1999 , pp. 273-288(16)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

The aim of the paper is to discuss some recent variants of familiar puzzles concerning the relations of parts to wholes put forward by Trenton Merricks and Eric Olson. The argument is put forward that so long as the familiar distinction between ‘loose and popular’ and ‘strict and philosophical’ senses of identity claims is accepted the paradoxical conclusions at which Merricks and Olson arrive can be resisted. It is not denied that accepting the distinction between ‘loose and popular’ and ‘strict and philosophical’ senses of identity claims is itself a departure from common-sense, but it is argued that it is the smallest such departure available to us.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy The University of Birmingham P.O. Box 363 Birmingham B15 2TTh.w.noonan@bham.ac.uk

Publication date: 1999-01-01

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