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STOIC DISAGREEMENT AND BELIEF RETENTION

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Abstract

Propositions are generally thought to have a truth-value only relative to some parameter or sequence of parameters. Many apparently straightforward notions, like what it is to disagree or retain a belief, become harder to explain once propositional truth is thus relativized. An account of disagreement within a framework involving such ‘stoic’ propositions is here presented. Some resources developed in that account are then used to respond to the eternalist charge that temporalist propositions can't function as belief contents because they don't allow us to make adequate sense of what belief retention amounts to.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley

Publication date: 2011-06-01

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