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KEEPING TRACK OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM

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Abstract

This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine

Publication date: 2011-06-01

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