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ACTING CONTRARY TO OUR PROFESSED BELIEFS OR THE GULF BETWEEN OCCURRENT JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITIONAL BELIEF

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Abstract:

Abstract

People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right to say that the person lacks the belief.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x

Affiliations: Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California at Riverside

Publication date: 2010-12-01

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