THE INADEQUACY OF PARAPHRASE IS THE DOGMA OF METAPHOR
Author: PHELAN, MARK
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 91, Number 4, December 2010 , pp. 481-506(26)
Philosophers have alleged that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate. They have presented this inadequacy as a datum predicted by, and thus a reason to accept, particular accounts of ‘metaphorical meanings.’ But to what, specifically, does this inadequacy claim amount? I argue that, if this assumption is to have any bearing on the metaphor debate, it must be construed as the comparative claim that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate compared to paraphrases of literal utterances. But the evidence philosophers have offered does not support the comparative inadequacy of paraphrases of metaphors. I offer my own empirical evidence against the inadequacy assumption.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of PhilosophyYale University
Publication date: December 1, 2010