EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, RELIABILITY, AND HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Author: TUCKER, CHRIS

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 90, Number 4, December 2009 , pp. 503-519(17)

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Abstract:

Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as good as Greco's alternative. Hence, Greco provides a good reason for neither rejecting Necessity nor endorsing inferential reliabilism.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01352.x

Affiliations: 1: Center for Philosophy of ReligionUniversity of Notre DameDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of Auckland

Publication date: 2009-12-01