KAUFMAN'S RESPONSE TO LUCRETIUS
Author: JOHANSSON, JENS
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 89, Number 4, December 2008 , pp. 470-485(16)
The symmetry argument is an objection to the ‘deprivation approach’– the account of badness favored by nearly all philosophers who take death to be bad for the one who dies. Frederik Kaufman's recent response to the symmetry argument is a development of Thomas Nagel's suggestion that we could not have come into existence substantially earlier than we in fact did. In this paper, I aim to show that Kaufman's suggestion fails. I also consider several possible modifications of his theory, and argue that they are unsuccessful as well.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics University of Oxford
Publication date: December 1, 2008