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DISPOSITIONAL COMPATIBILISM AND FRANKFURT-TYPE EXAMPLES

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Abstract:

Abstract:

This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not required for moral responsibility.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00317.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy University of Calgary

Publication date: 2008-06-01

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