THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL
Author: DOUVEN, IGOR
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 89, Number 2, June 2008 , pp. 204-225(22)
Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no valid reason not to give preference to the derived accounts over the accounts from which they come.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Institute of Philosophy University of Leuven
Publication date: June 1, 2008