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CAN RATIONALIST ABDUCTIVISM SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION?

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Abstract:

Abstract:

According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00314.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy University at Buffalo

Publication date: 2008-06-01

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