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A (SELLARSIAN) KANTIAN CRITIQUE OF HUME'S THEORY OF CONCEPTS

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Abstract: 

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume attempts to explain all human cognition in terms of impressions, ideas, and their qualities, behaviors, and relations. This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs, or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Publication date: 2007-12-01

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