ON THE DETERMINATION ARGUMENT AGAINST DEFLATIONISM

Author: PATTERSON, DOUGLAS1

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 88, Number 2, June 2007 , pp. 243-250(8)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

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It is argued that the “Determination Argument” against deflationary theories of truth put forward by Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan depends on a confusion between the terms used in a definition or analysis and the terms used in claiming that the definition or analysis is correct. With this distinction understood, one can see that the argument poses no threat to deflationary theories of truth.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00289.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy Kansas State University

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