CONTEXTUALISM AND WARRANTED ASSERTION

Author: STONE, JIM1

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 88, Number 1, March 2007 , pp. 92-113(22)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

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Contextualists offer “high-low standards” practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of warranted assertion and argue that it beats Kn as a response to the “knowledge” version of Moore's Paradox.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00282.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy The University of New Orleans, Email: jstone@uno.edu

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