IS “WHY BE MORAL?” A PSEUDO-QUESTION?: HOSPERS AND THORNTON ON THE AMORALIST'S CHALLENGE
Many arguments have been advanced for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. Thornton. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. For instance, if it is sound it has weighty consequences even if the argument in which it figures fails. Secondly, it is not sound; it succumbs to a simple objection.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
Publication date: 2006-12-01