THE VAGUENESS ARGUMENT FOR MEREOLOGICAL UNIVERSALISM*
Abstract:
In this paper, I critically discuss one of the more influential arguments for mereological universalism, what I will call ‘the Vagueness Argument’. I argue that a premise of the Vagueness Argument is not well supported and that there are at least two good reasons for thinking that the premise in question is false.
In this paper, I critically discuss one of the more influential arguments for mereological universalism, what I will call ‘the Vagueness Argument’. I argue that a premise of the Vagueness Argument is not well supported and that there are at least two good reasons for thinking that the premise in question is false.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy Virginia Commonwealth University
Publication date: 2006-09-01
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