THE LOCAL NATURE OF MODERN MORAL SKEPTICISM

Author: MACHUCA, DIEGO E.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 87, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 315-324(10)

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Abstract:

Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a good case against Annas' thesis. To accomplish this, it will be helpful to consider the Pyrrhonean attitude towards morality as expounded in Sextus Empiricus' work.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00262.x

Affiliations: 1: Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas Argentina

Publication date: 2006-09-01