BROWN ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRIMINABILITY1

Author: GOLDBERG, SANFORD C.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 87, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 301-314(14)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Abstract: 

In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge ‘achievement problem’ facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy University of Kentucky

Publication date: September 1, 2006

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