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RAWLS AND CARNAP ON DOING PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT METAPHYSICS

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Abstract:

Abstract: 

Some philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen, view Rawls's rejection of metaphysical claims, encapsulated in his method of avoidance, as being compatible with the “anti-philosophical” stance, the view that metaphysical debates are sterile and should be abandoned to be replaced by practically viable forms of thinking. This paper shows that this reading of the method of avoidance is incorrect and argues that the method of avoidance is in fact comparable to Carnap's higher-order standpoint of neutrality with regards to different frameworks. This sheds new light on Rawlsian theory and situates it within the empiricist tradition.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00237.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy Université du Québec à Montréal

Publication date: 2005-12-01

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