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RELIABILIST JUSTIFICATION (OR KNOWLEDGE) AS A GOOD TRUTH-RATIO

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Abstract:

Abstract: 

Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00236.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy Brooklyn College and the Graduate School, CUNY

Publication date: December 1, 2005

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