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On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent-causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy University of Georgia

Publication date: 2005-09-01

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