FOREKNOWLEDGE, FREEDOM, AND OBLIGATION

Author: HAJI, ISHTIYAQUE

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 86, Number 3, September 2005 , pp. 321-339(19)

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Abstract:

A vital presupposition of an influential argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free action is that free action requires alternative possibilities. A recent, noteworthy challenge to this presupposition invokes a “Divine Frankfurt-type example”: God's foreknowledge of one's future actions prevents one from doing otherwise without having any responsibility-undermining effect on one's actions. First, I explain why features of God's omniscience cast doubt on this Frankfurtian response. Second, even if this appraisal is mistaken, I argue that divine foreknowledge is irreconcilable with moral obligation if such foreknowledge eliminates alternatives.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00230.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota, Morris

Publication date: 2005-09-01