INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Author: Wilson R.A.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 84, Number 4, December 2003 , pp. 413-431(19)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

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This paper examines two recent attempts to articulate a particular relationship between intentionality and phenomenology. Terry Horgan and John Tienson (2002) have argued for what they call the inseparability thesis: that the intentional and the phenomenal are, in a certain sense, inseparable. Brian Loar (2002, 2003), following on from earlier work, has argued for a kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that is pervasive and more fundamental than ordinary wide content. Problems with both views can be seen once we consider a number of dimensions to intentionality, and reflect more generally on the notion of phenomenal intentionality itself.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00183.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University of Alberta

Publication date: 2003-12-01

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