Author: Latham N.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 84, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 270-290(21)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Abstract:

:

This paper investigates the thesis of token physicalism by examining what kinds of particulars there are and what it is for such particulars to be physical. It concludes that there is no coherent thesis of token physicalism that is strictly stronger than substance physicalism and strictly weaker than property physicalism on one or another of its interpretations, and spells out the implications of this for the project of defining minimal physicalism. In the course of the discussion the paper offers interpretations of the views of Davidson and Fodor and argues for an asymmetry between the concepts of the mental and the physical.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00173

Publication date: 2003-09-01

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