THE MORAL PERSPECTIVE OF HUMILITY

Author: Kupfer J.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 84, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 249-269(21)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

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Philosophers have been troubled by the apparent tension between humility and knowledge of one's excellence. However, humility is compatible with knowledge of one's merit because of the moral perspective in which humility is embedded. The perspective has four dimensions: radical dependence, moral comparison with other people, moral ideals, and objective valuation of things in the world. Recourse to this moral perspective also enables clarification of the relationship between humility and other virtues; what is wrong with arrogance; the role of belief of God in humility; and the difference between being humbled and being humiliated.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00172

Publication date: 2003-09-01

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