Pleasure, Pain, and Moral Character and Development

Author: Wielenberg E.J.¹

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 83, Number 3, September 2002 , pp. 282-299(18)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

I distinguish two kinds of pleasures – value–based pleasures, which can be explained in terms of the values of those who experience them, and brute pleasures, which cannot be so explained. I apply this distinction to three related projects. First, I critically examine a recent discussion of moral character by Colin McGinn, arguing that McGinn offers a distorted view of good character. Second, I try to elucidate certain remarks Aristotle makes about the relationships between pleasure and courage and pleasure and temperance. Third, I appeal to the distinction to elucidate the topic of moral improvement.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: DePauw University

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