Emotivism and Deflationary Truth

Author: Swan K.S.¹

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 83, Number 3, September 2002 , pp. 270-281(12)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non–cognitivists theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non–cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self–defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Bowling Green State University

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