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Alternative Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

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Abstract:

In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the intuitive plausibility of PAP.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.0000/107999099313703

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy Ursinus College

Publication date: June 1, 2002

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