Color Eliminativism and Color Experience

Author: Holman, Emmett L.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 83, Number 1, March 2002 , pp. 38-56(19)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Anyone who is a color eliminativist-i.e., believes that the physical world is colorless-must explain how our sense experience of color can be so systematically illusory. As it turns out, it is difficult to do this without committing oneself to dualism. In this paper I explore the options available to the color eliminativist in this regard, and argue that his/her prospects are more promising, though still far from certain, if s/he adopts the position that sense experience is strictly intentional.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.t01-1-00139

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, George Mason University

Publication date: March 1, 2002

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