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On Constitution and All-Fusions

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Abstract:

Recently, Judith Jarvis Thomson has offered a definition of the constitution relation against the backdrop of a robust ontology of objects she calls all-fusions. Despite finding her reasons to believe in all manner of all-fusions intriguing, in this paper I note an unsatisfactory consequence of her position for constitution-theorists. I argue that an unrestricted commitmentto all-fusions should lead the constitution-theorist to reject her definitionof the constitution relation, on the grounds that by choosing our all-fusionscarefully, we can secure the unpalatable result that two different all-fusionsconstitute (or are constituted by) the same thing, even though neither one ofthem constitutes the other.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00104

Affiliations: Western Washington University

Publication date: September 1, 2000

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