Skip to main content

On the Tenability of Non-Factualism with Regard to the A Priori

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

In a number of recent articles, Hartry Field has attempted to reclaim the a priori for his own brand of non-factualist epistemology by introducing a non-epistemic notion of the a priori based purely upon the position of individual beliefs within belief systems. In this article we examine (i) whether a robust enough notion of aprioricity is available to Field, and, by extension, to the radical empiricist and (ii) whether it is possible to connect up the non-epistemic notion of aprioricity with questions about the epistemic status of those beliefs that happen to be a priori in the non-epistemic sense.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00090

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Brown University

Publication date: December 1, 1999

bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000004/art00005
dcterms_title,dcterms_description,pub_keyword
6
5
20
40
5

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more