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On the Tenability of Non-Factualism with Regard to the A Priori

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In a number of recent articles, Hartry Field has attempted to reclaim the a priori for his own brand of non-factualist epistemology by introducing a non-epistemic notion of the a priori based purely upon the position of individual beliefs within belief systems. In this article we examine (i) whether a robust enough notion of aprioricity is available to Field, and, by extension, to the radical empiricist and (ii) whether it is possible to connect up the non-epistemic notion of aprioricity with questions about the epistemic status of those beliefs that happen to be a priori in the non-epistemic sense.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Brown University

Publication date: 1999-12-01

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