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The Role of Reflection in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

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Abstract:

There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant’s account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00080

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona

Publication date: June 1, 1999

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