Semantics and the Dual-Aspect use of Definite Descriptions

Author: O'Rourke M.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 79, Number 3, September 1998 , pp. 264-288(25)

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Abstract:

Many philosophers of language have held that a truth-conditional semantic account can explain the data motivating the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, but I believe this is a mistake. I argue that these data also motivate what I call "dual-aspect" uses as a distinct but closely related type. After establishing that an account of the distinction must also explain dual-aspect uses, I argue that the truth-conditional Semantic Model of the distinction cannot. Thus, the Semantic Model cannot explain the data for which it is developed and so fails as an account of the referential/attributive distinction.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Idaho

Publication date: 1998-09-01