Propositions and Reasoning in Russell and Frege

Author: Kemp¹

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 79, Number 3, September 1998 , pp. 218-235(18)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

Both Russell and Frege were inclined to think that there is nothing essentially linguistic about thought: any actual reliance of ours upon language is a mere psychological contingency. If so then it should be possible to formulate logic in such a way that logical relationships are not represented or expressed as principles pertaining to linguistic forms. Russell and Frege take pains to achieve this, but fail. I explain this by looking at some features of Grundgesetz and Principia. Their failure, I suggest, is due to the nature of the case.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00059

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow

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