Secondary and Tertiary Qualities: Semantics and Response-Dependence

Author: Miscevic N.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 78, Number 4, December 1997 , pp. 363-379(17)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Abstract: Secondary and tertiary qualities are plausibly explained along dispositionalist lines. Concepts of such qualities are response-dependent, denoting properties that are partly mind/brain-dependent. Unfortunately, dispositionalism is hard to square with extant versions of naturalistic theories of representation. In particular the standard naturalistic (indicational) semantics of representational content cannot handle the question from either the subjectivist or the dispositional viewpoint. The paper proposes a remedy: the problem can be solved in a smooth and natural way, provided that we revise and supplement the standard semantics in a rather obvious fashion, by allowing the mind/brain-involving properties to figure within it.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 1997-12-01

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