Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Author: Rickless S.C.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 78, Number 3, September 1997 , pp. 297-319(23)

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Abstract:

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, valid and (in one case) persuasive as well.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 1997-09-01