Problems with Principle P

Author: Caplin H.

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 78, Number 3, September 1997 , pp. 261-277(17)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Abstract:

Abstract: In Psychosemantics Fodor presents three arguments for preferring the language of thought over mere intentional realism - arguments for the conclusion that intentional causes of behavior have constituent structure. The first of these, relying on the methodological `Principle P', is considered in detail here and is found wanting. This principle does not prefer the language of thought to those very connectionist systems which Fodor criticizes; and it rests on dubious theoretical and empirical assumptions.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 1997-09-01

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