Individualism and the Cross Contexts Test

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In this Subject: Philosophy
By this author: Barrett, Jonathan

Author: Barrett, Jonathan

Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 78, Number 3, September 1997 , pp. 242-260(19)

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Abstract:

: Jerry Fodor has defended the claim that psychological theories should appeal to narrow rather than wide intentional properties. One of his arguments relies upon the cross contexts test, a test that purports to determine whether two events have the same causally relevant properties. Critics have charged that this test is too weak, since it counts certain genuinely explanatory relational properties in science as being causally irrelevant. Further, it has been claimed, the test is insensitive to the fact that special scientific laws allow for exceptions which do not undermine those laws. This paper refines the cross contexts test to meet these objections while still allowing it to play its role in Fodor's argument for narrow content in psychology.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00038

Publication date: 1997-09-01