Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem

$48.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Download / Buy Article:

Abstract:

Abstract

This paper defends a conceptualist answer to the question how objects come by their modal properties. It isolates the controversial metaphysical assumptions that are needed to get ontological conceptualism off the ground, outlines the conceptualist answer to the question and shows that conceptualism is not in as bad a shape as some critics have maintained.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00765.x

Affiliations: Duke University

Publication date: June 1, 2011

Related content

Tools

Favourites

Share Content

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more