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Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Volume 36, Number 1, December 2002

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Realism and Relativism
pp. 1-25(25)
Author: Bilgrami, Akeel

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Underdetermination and Realism
pp. 26-50(25)
Author: Devitt, Michael

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Quantifier Variance and Realism
pp. 51-73(23)
Author: Hirsch, Eli

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Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism
pp. 74-96(23)
Authors: Horgan, Terry; Timmons, Mark

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Response–dependence without Tears
pp. 97-117(21)
Authors: Jackson, Frank; Pettit, Philip

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Is There a True Metaphysics of Material Objects?
pp. 118-145(28)
Author: Sidelle, Alan

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Knowledge of the World
pp. 146-175(30)
Author: Strawson, Galen

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The Number of Things
pp. 176-196(21)
Author: van Inwagen, Peter

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On Logical Relativity
pp. 197-219(23)
Author: Varzi, Achille C.

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Abstract Objects: A Case Study
pp. 220-240(21)
Author: Yablo, Stephen

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Meta–Ethics and Normative Commitment
pp. 241-263(23)
Author: Dreier, James

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Earning the Right to Realism or Relativism in Ethics
pp. 264-285(22)
Author: Rovane, Carol

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Moral Realism and Indeterminacy
pp. 286-304(19)
Author: Schiffer, Stephen

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Moral Relativity and Intuitionism
pp. 305-328(24)
Authors: Sinnott–Armstrong, Walter

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Contributors
pp. 348-348(1)

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