Author: Hattiangadi, Anandi

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 21, Number 2, April 2006 , pp. 220-240(21)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Abstract:

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Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic `ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern of use can be described as `correct'. For the anti-naturalist argument to go forward, content must be prescriptive. I argue, however, that it is not. Moreover, the thesis that content supplies standards for correct use is insufficient to supply a similar, a priori objection to naturalism.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2006.00312.x

Publication date: 2006-04-01

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