What Feelings Can't Do

Author: Sizer, Laura

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 21, Number 1, February 2006 , pp. 108-135(28)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

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Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the role feelings can play in our psychology that is consistent with current psychological and neurological data.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00308.x

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