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Mental Mirroring as the Origin of Attributions

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A ‘Radical Simulationist’ account of how folk psychology functions has been developed by Robert Gordon. I argue that Radical Simulationism is false. In its simplest form it is not sufficient to explain our attribution of mental states to subjects whose desires and preferences differ from our own. Modifying the theory to capture these attributions invariably generates innumerable other false attributions. Further, the theory predicts that deficits in mentalizing ought to co‐occur with certain deficits in imagining perceptually‐based scenarios. I present evidence suggesting that this prediction is false, and outline further possible empirical tests of the theory.
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2005-11-01

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